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Walsh: Criminal Procedure - The Right to a Speedy Trial - Has the Wyomin

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - The Right to a Speedy Trial-Has the
Wyoming Supreme Court Correctly Applied the Balancing Test?
Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989).
On the evening of January 5, 1986, Jetty Lee Harvey, Everett W.
Phillips1 and David Swazo abducted a 38 - year old woman from a sidewalk in Rock Springs, Wyoming, forced her into Phillips' crew cab
pickup, and drove away. Thereafter, the vehicle proceeded to the outskirts of the city and Swazo sexually assaulted the victim while Harvey and Phillips looked on encouraging him.2 Fortunately for the victim, an individual in a nearby vehicle witnessed the abduction and
reported it to the police. The police immediately responded to the call,
intercepted Phillips' pickup, and arrested both Harvey and Swazo on
the spot.' The police did not arrest Phillips because the victim did not
initially implicate him in the crime. 4 On January 9, 1986, following
further investigation, the police arrested Phillips.'
Following Harvey's arrest, on January 5, 1986, approximately eighteen months elapsed before he was brought to trial. On February 5,
1986, the prosecution filed an information in district court charging
Harvey with kidnapping and sexual assault.6 On February 18, 1986,
Harvey filed a motion for discovery and a motion to dismiss. After that
date, the record was silent for a period of nearly ten months as to any
further proceedings. 7
Finally, December 5, 1986, the record indicates that the court sent
a letter notifying the parties that the individual cases of Harvey, Phillips and Swazo8 would be consolidated for trial. This trial was set for
January 6, 1987. On December 9, 1986, the State obtained a continuance of the trial. 9
On January 16, 1987, Harvey retained counsel and submitted a pro
forma motion to the district court to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. °
1. For the purposes of this casenote the discussion will focus on Harvey v. State,
774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989), with reference to Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989),
made in the footnotes.
2. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 90.
3. Id.
4. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 120.
5. Phillips was arrested on January 9, 1986. His trial commenced on July 21,
1987. Phillips,774 P.2d at 120-21. Harvey's trial also began on July 21, 1987. Harvey,
774 P.2d at 91.
6. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 90. There were 531 days between the filing of the information and the trial. Id. at 93. The total delay in Phillips' case was also approximately
eighteen months, but the time from information to trial was only 372 days. The information in Phillips' case was filed on July 14, 1986. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 122.
7. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 90.
8. Swazo subsequently entered a guilty plea and had been sentenced to the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Id. at 91.
9. Id. at 90. The court found no record of the continuance, but the State
acknowledged obtaining the continuance in its brief. Without the State's concession
there would be no explanation of why the trial was not held on January 6, 1986. Id.
10. Id. at 91. For unknown reasons this motion was never filed, but the State conceded in its brief that the motion was submitted on that date. Id.
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On April 27, 1987, he filed another motion with an accompanying certificate stating that the January 16th motion had been submitted."
Harvey did not request a hearing on either of these motions, and after
sixty days the motions were deemed automatically denied. 12 On July
20, 1987, one day prior to trial, Harvey joined in Phillips' motion to
dismiss for lack of speedy trial."
On July 21, 1987, trial was finally held, 562 days after the arrest.
Harvey was convicted of kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault.14
Harvey appealed the conviction to the Wyoming Supreme Court which
determined that the dispositive issue in the case was whether, under
the circumstances, Harvey had been denied his right to a speedy trial."
The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that a delay of eighteen
months between Harvey's arrest and the time he was brought to trial
violated his right to a speedy trial. 6 The court reversed the conviction
and dismissed Harvey's information. 7
This casenote focuses on the Wyoming Supreme Court's application of the Barker balancing test to the facts in Harvey, and specifically, it examines whether the Wyoming Supreme Court gave undue
weight to certain factors in the balancing formula; thus leading the
court to an erroneous result.
BACKGROUND

The right to a speedy trial is one of the fundamental rights secured
by the sixth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.', The
United States Supreme Court has applied the right to a speedy trial
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 9 The Wyoming Constitution also provides defendants with the right to a speedy trial.2"
In addition, under Rule 204 of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts
of the State of Wyoming, the prosecution has 120 days from the filing
11. Id. On July 6, 1987, Phillips made a motion to dismiss for speedy trial, fifteen
days before the trial began. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 121.
12. UNIF. R. DiST. CTS. Wyo. 301.
13. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 91.
14. Id. Phillips was also convicted of the same charges. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 119.
15. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 89. For purposes of the appeal, Phillips was the companion case to Harvey. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 119.
16. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 97.
17. Id. (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973)). The Wyoming Supreme
Court also dismissed Phillips' information and overturned his conviction. Phillips' case
was much closer than Harvey's because Phillips was responsible for some of the delay,
and he was not diligent in asserting his right to a speedy trial. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 125.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
19. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
20. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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of an information or indictment to bring a defendant to trial.21 However,
Wyoming courts have used this rule in an advisory nature, and have
not interpreted it as a mandatory rule.22
The United States Supreme Court attempted for the first time to
decide what constitutes a speedy trial in Barker v. Wingo.22 The Barker Court developed a four part balancing test to determine whether
the defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated. 24 Under the balancing test four factors were assessed: length of the delay, the reason for
the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial,
and whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.2 5
In Barker,Willie Barker and Silas Manning were arrested in July
of 1958 for the brutal murder of an elderly couple. The State of Kentucky had a stronger case against Manning, and felt that Barker could
21. Rule 204 provides:
a) It is the responsibility of court and counsel to insure to each person
charged with crime a speedy trial.
b) A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 120 days following
the filing of information or indictment.
c) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:
1) All proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the
defendant.
2) Proceedings on another charge.
3) Delay granted by the court pursuant to Section (d).
4) The time between the dismissal and the refiling of the same charge.
5) Delay occasioned by defendant's change of counsel or application
therefor.
d) Continuances may be granted as follows:
1) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit of defendant and
defendant's counsel.
2) On motion of the prosecuting attorney or the court if:
i) the defendant expressly consents; or
ii) the state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; or
iii) Required in the due administration ofjustice and the defendant
will not be substantially prejudiced.
e) Upon receiving notice of possible delay the defendant shall show in
writing how the delay may prejudice his defense.
f) If the defendant is unavailable for any proceeding at which his presence
is required, the time period shall begin anew upon defendant's being
available.
UNIF. R. DiST. CTS. WYo. 204.

22. Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168, 172 (Wyo. 1981). Robinson discusses Rule
22 which was the precursor to Rule 204.
23. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
24. The Court rejected two approaches that had been used in the past. The first
was that the Constitution require a defendant to be offered a trial within a specific
number of days or months. This would require the Court to engage in legislative or
rulemaking activity, rather than the adjudicative process to which they should confine their efforts. Barker, 407 U.S. at 523. The demand-waiver rule was also rejected.
The demand-waiver doctrine states that a defendant waives his right to a speedy trial
for the period of time that he has not demanded a trial. Id. at 524-25. The Court felt
this would place defense counsel in an awkward position to demand an early trial. Id.
at 527-28.
25. Id. at 530. The balancing test is essentially an ad hoc approach to determine
if the right has been violated.
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not be convicted unless Manning testified against him.2 6 The State
proceeded to prosecute Manning and obtained a series of sixteen continuances of Barker's trial. After nearly four and a half years, and six
trials, Manning was finally convicted in December of 1962.27 During
this time, Barker was incarcerated for ten months and had made two
pro forma motions to dismiss for violation of speedy trial. 28 Following
Manning's conviction, the State moved to set Barker's trial for March
19, 1963. However, because of illness to a primary witness, the trial
was again continued. In October of 1963, Barker's trial finally commenced. 29 Over five and a half years had elapsed between Barker's
arrest and trial.
The Court found that the five and a half year lapse between Barker's arrest and trial was extraordinary and that it was mostly
attributable to the prosecution." However, the Court concluded that
the delay did not violate Barker's right to a speedy trial because it was
outweighed by two counterbalancing factors: 1) the prejudice to Barker caused by the delay was minimal because there was no claim that
the delay had impaired his defense; and 2) that Barker had not
vigorously asserted his right to a speedy trial.2
Under the balancing test, length of delay is essentially a "triggering mechanism". Until a delay exists which is "presumptively
prejudicial""2 , there is no necessity to inquire into the other three factors. 3 The Court reasoned that the speedy trial right is so imprecise,
a court must consider the individual facts of each case in deciding
whether the length of delay will trigger further analysis.-' If the length
of the delay is sufficient, then the other factors must be considered.
The second factor, is the reason for the delay, or "the reason the
government assigns to justify the delay. ' 35 The weight assigned to this
26. Id. at 516.
27. Id. at 516-17.

28. Barker, 407 U.S. at 517.
29. Id. at 517-18.
30. Id. at 533-34.
31. Id. at 534.
32. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.2 at 688 (1985). LaFave and
Israel attempted to shed light on what presumptively prejudicial is, by stating:
The reference to "delay which is presumptively prejudicial" is somewhat
confusing, but viewing the case in its entirety it seems fair to say that
this phrase does not mean a period of time so long that it may actually
be presumed the defense at trial would be impaired. Nor does it mean
that once a sufficient time has been shown the prosecution has the burden of establishing that in fact there was no prejudice. The Court apparently meant that a claim of denial of speedy trial may be heard after the
passage of a period of time which is, prima facie, unreasonable in the circumstances.

Id.
33. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
34. Id. The Court exemplified this by stating that, "[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Id. at 531.
35. Id.
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factor will vary depending on the reason for the delay. A deliberate
attempt to delay the trial will weigh heavily against the government;
a more neutral reason, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, will
weigh less heavily but should still be considered; and a valid reason
will serve to justify the delay.36
The third factor is the assertion by the defendant of his right to
a speedy trial. This factor is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in
deciding if a right has been violated. 7 Courts should weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed to attaching significant
weight to a purely pro forma objection. 38 Significant weight will not
be given simply by making a pro forma motion for a speedy trial. The
defendant must diligently assert his right or it will be difficult for him
to prove he was denied a speedy trial.3 9
The fourth factor is the prejudice to the defendant caused by the
delay. Prejudice to the defendant is broken down into three categories:
1) oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) anxiety and concern of the
accused; and 3) the possibility that the defense will be impaired as a
result of the delay.4" Of these, the extent to which the defense will be
impaired is the most important, "because the inability of a defendant
' 41
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.
None of the four factors are necessary to establish that a violation
has occurred. They are related factors to be considered along with other
relevant circumstances.4 2 An affirmative demonstration of prejudice
is not necessary to prove a denial of the right to a speedy trial.43 The
Barker Court outlined this test to aid lower courts in determining
whether a speedy trial violation exists, not to establish a rigid test.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has consistently applied the Barker
test: The length of delay is a triggering mechanism; 44 allocating the
appropriate weight to the various classifications of reason for delay;45
inquiring into whether the defendant vigorously pressed his right to
a speedy trial; 46 and taking into account any evidence regarding the
36. Id.
37. Id. at 531-32. Although the Court rejected the demand-waiver rule they were
not willing to go so far as to say that the defendant has no responsibility in asserting
the right. Id. at 528.
38. Id. at 529.
39. Id. at 532.
40. Id.
41. Id. If witnesses die or disappear, or if loss of memory prevents witnesses from

accurately recalling past events, this will result in prejudice to the defendant brought
about by the delay. Id.

42. Id. at 533. "In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must

still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing

with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution." Id.
43. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973).
44. Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo. 1979).
45. Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1265 (Wyo. 1985).
46. Robinson, 627 P.2d at 171.
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three types of prejudice47 to determine if there was actual prejudice.4"
In addition, the court has used Rule 204 of the Uniform Rules for the
District Courts as a factor in the balancing test. 49 Only once, prior to
the instant case has the court found5 0the balance tipped in favor of the
defendant, warranting a dismissal.
The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the four part balancing test
from Barker in Cosco v. State.5 1 The Cosco court held that a nineteen
month delay was not a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial where

the delay did not prejudice the defendant. 2 In Cosco, the delays which

did occur were mostly for the benefit of or caused by the defendant and
no indication of unreasonable delay attributable to the prosethere was
5

cution.

1

The Wyoming Supreme Court has decided a long line of cases since
Cosco without finding a speedy trial violation under the Barkerbalancing test. 4 In Cherniwchan,the court found that the speedy trial rights
considered the
were infringed, but decided that when all things were
55
stringent remedy of dismissal was not called for.
Relying on Barker, the Cherniwchancourt determined the length
of delay of 107 days was unconscionable and the county and court were

to blame. However, the court noted that the defendants did not assert
their rights to a speedy trial during the delay, and that left the court
to decide if there was prejudice sufficient to warrant dismissal.5 6
Although the defendants had been wronged, the wrongs did not

prejudice their ability to defend.

7 The

court found there was no viola-

tion because the defendants failed to show that the delay had prejudiced
their ability to defend. 58 Although the court found no violation, they
did issue a stern warning admonishing law enforcement officials in
Wyoming. "[Tihis must not happen again, and all persons-whether
47. Oppressive pretrial incarceration; any unusual pretrial anxieties; or any impairment of the defense. Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 645 (Wyo. 1981).
48. Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 671 (Wyo. 1982).
49. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 93 (citing Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260 (Wyo. 1985); Cook
v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 1981); Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1981)). In Cook,
the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected a strict reading of Rule 204, holding that a strict
reading of the time limitations conflicts with the balancing test from Barker.The time
limitation of the rule limits the flexibility and thus the balancing test is preferred. Cook,
631 P.2d at 10 (citing Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1981)).
50. Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 875 (Wyo. 1976).
51. 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo. 1972).
52. Id. at 1406.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986); Caton v. State, 709
P.2d 1260 (Wyo. 1985); Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1982); Robinson v. State,
627 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1981); Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 1981); Heinrich v. State,
638 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1981); Estrada v. State, 611 P.2d 850 (Wyo. 1980); Phillips v. State,
597 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1979); Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464 (Wyo. 1979); Hurst v.
State, 563 P.2d 232 (Wyo. 1977).
55. Cherniwchan, 594 P.2d at 470.
56. Id. at 469.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 470.
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they be prisoners or whomsoever-will be given their Rule-5 and speedytrial rights, failing which the supervisory authority of this5 9 court will
be brought into play to address such negligent conduct.1
In Estradav. State, the court again applied the Barkertest to reach
the conclusion that there was no sixth amendment violation of a speedy
trial.6 ° Eleven months elapsed between the filing of the complaint and
Estrada's trial. The court found the delay was sufficient to trigger further inquiry into the other factors.6 1 Although the delay was partly
attributed to extradition procedures, necessary to bring Estrada from
Kansas to Wyoming to face charges, the court determined that there
was no sinister motive in any unnecessary delay in bringing Estrada
into Wyoming. 2 Estrada also failed to show any evidence to support
his claim of prejudice. 63 The court again found that without evidence
the delay, the defendant's speedy trial
of prejudice or bad faith causing
64
right had not been violated.
In fact, only one Wyoming case prior to Harvey has found a violation of the right to a speedy trial under the Barker balancing test.6 5
In Stuebgen v. State, there was an eighteen month delay between arrest
and trial. The court found that the State could not show good cause
for the delay or that the delay was necessary. The delay also resulted
in prejudice to the defendants' employment and education. The court
the prejudice were sufficient
found the failure to show good cause, and
66
to establish a speedy trial violation.
PRINCIPAL CASE

Justice Macy, writing for the majority stated that, "It was perhaps
inevitable, . . . that this Court would eventually be confronted with

a case wherein the result in Stuebgen and the warning in Cherniwchan would not have been heeded."'6' 7 In a 3-2 decision the Wyoming
Supreme Court determined that the State had violated Jetty Lee Harvey's right to a speedy trial.6 8 The court arrived at this conclusion by
applying the Barkerbalancing test: the length of the delay; the reason
for the delay; the assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and the
59. Id.
60. Estrada v. State, 611 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo. 1980).
61. The Wyoming Supreme Court stated that the Barkerfacts were different, but
they cited Barker to illustrate the point that even very lengthy delays are not per se
violative of the constitution. Id. at 853.
62. Id. at 854. The Wyoming Supreme Court quoted the pertinent language from
Barker: " 'Neutral' unnecessary delay 'should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must
rest with the government rather than with the defendant.' " Id.
63. Id. at 855.
64. Id.
65. Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1976).
66. Id. at 875.
67. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 90.
68. Id. at 97.
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prejudice resulting from the delay.6 9 Balancing all four factors led the
7
court to the conclusion that a speedy trial violation had occurred. "
The court determined that a delay of eighteen months from arrest
to trial raised a presumption of prejudice that weighed heavily in the
defendant's favor.7 ' The court also used Wyoming District Court Rule
204 as a touchstone in the analysis, and concluded that a delay four
sufficient to
times greater than the period prescribed by the rule was
72
trigger further analysis into the other three factors.
Likewise, the Court found that the State had failed to meet the bur73
den of showing that the delays were reasonable or necessary. Therefore, the court attributed the entire reason for the delay to the State.
However, the court made no finding regarding whether the delay was
neutral as opposed to deliberate, nor did it find anything in the record
74
indicating sinister motive on behalf of the State. Nevertheless, the
the reason for the delay weighed substantially in favor of
court found
75
Harvey.
Next, the court concluded that Harvey had adequately asserted his
76
right to a speedy trial and that this weighed in his favor. Even though
Harvey did not vigorously press his two motions to dismiss,77the court
stated that Harvey had no duty to bring himself to trial.
Finally, the court found that the prejudice factor also weighed in
Harvey's favor. 78 Despite the fact that there was no lengthy pretrial
incarceration, no prejudice in the ability to defend, or any actual anxiety suffered, the court felt the eighteen month delay was sufficient to
presume prejudice. Relying on Justice Brennan's concurrence in Dickey
v. Florida, the court reasoned that prejudice should be presumed in
the case of excessive delay.79
The majority's presumption of prejudice led Justice Thomas to dis°
sent. He argued that there was not any actual prejudice to Harvey.
There was no evidence that Harvey suffered from anxiety or any other
8
aspect of prejudice; the effects were simply presumed. Even if Harvey had shown he was anxious, Justice Thomas concluded no speedy
69. Id. at 92-97.
70. Id. at 97.
71. Id. at 94.

72. Id. (citing Caton, 709 P.2d at 1265).
73. Id. at 95 (citing Estrada,611 P.2d at 854; Stuebgen, 548 P.2d at 875).

74. Id. The court concluded that there had been no good faith effort to bring Har-

vey to trial as quickly as possible. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 96.

77. Id. (citing Barker,407 U.S. at 527; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38 (1970)).
78. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 97.
79. Id. at 96 (citing Dickey, 398 U.S. at 39 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The
Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the language from Brennan's concurrence in Dickey,
in Cherniwchan, 594 P.2d at 469, and Caton, 709 P.2d at 1266.
80. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 114 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

81. Id.
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trial violation occurred because, "he doubted that a cloud of suspicion
is very troublesome to the guilty ....""
Justice Golden, also dissented asserting that the majority had
achieved an inspired application of the doctrine of stare decisis. 3 By
comparing the facts from Barker with those in Harvey, Justice Golden
concluded that the majority had reached an absurd result.8 4 He felt that
if the majority were deciding a Willie Barker-like case today, they would
reverse his conviction. 5
Justice Golden also felt the majority was trying to send a message
to the district judge with the opinion.8" Justice Golden feared the
majority had lost sight of the issue before the court; whether substantive analysis would be given to the factors in Barker.8"
ANALYSIS

To analyze the Harvey decision, it is necessary to look carefully at
the way in which the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the four factors from Barker.8 The Wyoming Supreme Court was blinded by their
determination to realize their warning from Cherniwchan, and misapplied the Barker balancing test. The four factors must be considered
together and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances.8 9
Length of Delay
Initially, the courts should consider the length of delay mainly as
a triggering mechanism. 0 "Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance."9 1 In cases where the length of delays
82. Id.
83. Id. at 117 (Golden, J., dissenting). Justice Golden's dissent in Harvey is consistent with his stance in Phillips. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 126 (Golden, J., dissenting).
84. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 117. Making the comparison, Justice Golden stated:
Of course, Mr. Harvey's and Mr. Phillips' facts of consequence were not
quite the same as Willie Barker's. Willie Barker's trial was delayed nearly
five years, Mr. Harvey's and Mr. Phillips' only eighteen months. Willie
Barker suffered nearly ten months' pretrial incarceration; Mr. Harvey
and Mr. Phillips suffered none. Willie Barker made several pro forma
pretrial speedy trial assertions, as did Mr. Harvey; Mr. Phillips made none.
Mr. Barker's conviction was affirmed and he is now serving his life sentence. Mr. Harvey's and Mr. Phillips' convictions were reversed and they
are now roaming the streets of Wyoming as free men.

Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 118.
88. Unless noted, this analysis applies equally to the situation in Phillips.
89. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 92 (citing Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973); Heinrich
v. State, 638 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1981)).
90. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.

91. Id.
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have been factually similar to the delay in Harvey,92 the court has used
the length of delay merely as a touchstone to prompt further investigation.
However, in Harvey, the Wyoming Supreme Court gave substantial weight to the defendant simply because of the length of delay. 5
This is inconsistent with prior decisions.9 4 The Barker Court characterized the five and a half year delay as extraordinary, but refused to
give the delay factor substantial weight and did not indicate whether
the length of delay weighed in Barker's favor. 5 The delay in Barker
was considerably longer than the delay in Harvey. If the United States
Supreme Court did not give substantial weight to a five and a half year
delay, it is illogical that a delay one-third as long should weigh heavily in Harvey's favor.
Reason for the Delay
Secondly, courts must examine the reason or cause for the delay. 6
"[I]t is recognized that neutral or innocent unnecessary delay should
be weighed less heavily against the State than deliberate unnecessary
delay ..... 9 Mere negligence in bringing the defendant to trial is considered a neutral delay and weighs less heavily than a deliberate
attempt to delay the trial.9
In Harvey, the Wyoming Supreme Court afforded substantial weight
to the reason for the delay because the State could not justify the delay,
and because no good faith effort was made to bring Harvey to trial.9 9
However, the court found no evidence that the delay was attributable
to any sinister motive on behalf of the State in bringing Harvey to
trial. °0 Finding no good faith effort, nor any sinister motive, would
imply that the reason for the delay was simple negligence on the part
of the State. Since negligence is considered a neutral delay, receiving
less weight, substantial weight should not be attributed to the reason
for the delay. Certainly this factor should weigh in favor of Harvey,
but giving this factor substantial weight is too liberal.
The first two factors of the Barker test tip the balance in favor of
Harvey, but not by the considerable weight allocated by the majority.
The situation in Barker,was considerably more egregious than the case
92. Grable, 649 P.2d at 670; Heinrich,638 P.2d at 644. The delays were 419 and
453 days respectively, and there was no discussion by the court of the delay weighing
heavily in favor of the defendant. The delay only triggered further analysis, and would
be taken into account in applying the balancing test.
93. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 94.
94. Grable, 649 P.2d at 670; Heinrich, 638 P.2d at 644.
95. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
96. Id. at 531.
97. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 95 (citing Caton, 709 P.2d at 1265; Estrada v. State, 611
P.2d 850 (Wyo. 1980); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1980)).
98. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
99. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 95.
100. Id.
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at hand. The delay was five and a half years, of which nearly all was
attributable to the State. Yet, in Barker, the weight given to the length
and reason for delay was counterbalanced by the other two factors. 01'
Defendant's Assertion of His Right
Thirdly, courts inquire into the defendant's responsibility to assert
his right to a speedy trial. °2 The majority in Harvey glosses over the
distinction between a pro forma objection and one that is diligently
asserted. The majority correctly distinguished between a counseled
failure to object versus an uncounseled failure to object.1 3 However,
this distinction focuses on the timing of the objection as opposed to the
nature of the objection itself. Even though Harvey asserted his right
shortly after he retained counsel, the motion was merely pro forma.104
In Barker,the Court weighed the frequency and force of the objections
instead of attaching significant weight to purely pro forma objections. 05
The Wyoming Supreme court afforded weight to Harvey's two pro
forma motions to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. 10 The Barker Court
gave no weight to Barker's three pro forma motions, holding that Barker's failure to vigorously assert his right weighed heavily against
him.0 7 Since Harvey's motions were pro forma the majority erred in
affording any weight to them.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that they would
be hard pressed to find a speedy trial violation when the facts indicate
that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.' Two pro forma motions
that were never diligently asserted certainly implies that no speedy
trial was wanted.
Prejudice to Defendant
Finally, the court must consider the prejudice that the defendant
suffers as a result of the delay. 0 9 The Wyoming Supreme Court found
this factor weighed in Harvey's favor because they presumed Harvey
was prejudiced by the lengthy delay. 10 No evidence was presented to
101. Barker, 407 U.S. at 534.
102. Id. at 531.
103. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 96. The court gave credence to the fact that shortly after
Harvey retained private counsel he promptly asserted his right to a speedy trial. This
distinction between counseled and uncounseled objection was first recognized in Estrada.
Estrada, 611 P.2d at 854-55.
104. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 117 (Golden, J., dissenting).
105. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529.
106. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 96. In Phillips there was no assertion of right until fifteen
days prior to trial. The majority determined that failing to assert the right did not weigh
for or against Phillips. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 121, 124.
107. Barker, 407 U.S. at 534-36.
108. Id. at 536.
109. Id. at 532.
110. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 97.
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indicate that Harvey had suffered any actual prejudice from the delay."1
The court deemed the eighteen month delay sufficiently long to find
a presumption
of prejudice with respect to pretrial anxiety and related
112
concerns.

In Barker, the United States Supreme Court did not articulate a
presumption of prejudice when discussing the fourth factor in the
balance." 3 The Barker Court gave virtually no weight to any anxiety
that Willie Barker may have experienced during his five and a half
year delay." 4
The Harvey court relied on the language of Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Dickey. 5 to justify a finding of presumed anxiety
prejudice. Brennan's discussion was not binding precedent for future
speedy trial cases, it was offered as an academic comment that the Court
should begin to consider the basic questions presented by various speedy
trial scenarios." 6 Certainly, if the Supreme Court had intended for
Justice Brennan's language to be binding they could have adopted it
in Barker and presumed anxiety prejudice to Willie Barker."' But they
did not. Therefore, the Wyoming Supreme Court incorrectly provided
weight in favor of Harvey under the prejudice factor.
The Barker Court found no prejudice that would favor the defendant in that case since the Court described the factor of prejudice as
a counterbalance that outweighed length, and reason for delay." 8 Never
before had the Wyoming Supreme Court presumed any sort of prejudice
in the long line of speedy trial cases it had decided. The Wyoming
Supreme Court has also given very little weight to the idea of anxiety
prejudice. They have recognized that the defendant may be anxious
during the delay but no more severely than is usually experienced by
an accused.""
In a case where length of delay and reason for delay were much
greater, the United States Supreme Court found these deficiencies could
be outweighed. In a case where the length of delay was much shorter
and the reason for the delay was neutral, the Wyoming Supreme Court
concluded that a presumption of prejudice and pro forma assertions of
right, resulted in a speedy trial violation.
111. It is not necessary that prejudice be affirmatively shown in order to prove a
violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, Moore, 414 U.S. at 26, and Heinrich, 638 P.2d at 644, but it is an important factor to consider.
112. Harvey, 774 P.2d at 97.
113. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
114. Although the Barker Court did found minimal anxiety prejudice to Barker,
it did not affect his ability to defend. Id.
115. Dickey, 398 U.S. at 39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Phillips, 774 P.2d at 129 (Golden, J., dissenting).
117. "More telling is Justice Brennan's vote in Barker, where he joined Justice
White's concurrence . .. but, when push came to shove, concurred in affirming Barker's conviction." Id. at 129-30.
118. Barker, 407 U.S. at 534.
119. Sodergren, 715 P.2d at 178; Grable, 649 P.2d at 671.
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Certainly the possibility for prejudice was much greater in Barker
where there was a five and a half year delay and he was incarcerated
for ten months, than in Harvey's case where the delay was approximately eighteen months and there was no incarceration. The Barker
Court found minimal anxiety prejudice to Barker, none of which
weighed in his favor in the balance. In Harvey, prejudice was presumed
from a year and a half delay and weighed in favor of Harvey. This
appears to be contradictory to the finding from Barker.Certainly Willie Barker was prejudiced more by a five year delay than Harvey by
an eighteen month delay. If the length and reason for delay were overcome by the other two factors in Barker, then a shorter, neutral delay
should be counterbalanced by the lack of prejudice and failure to
12
vigorously assert the speedy trial right in Harvey."
CONCLUSION

If the Wyoming Supreme Court had properly applied the balancing test, and followed the precedent from the United States Supreme
Court they would have affirmed Harvey's conviction. In a case that
is far less extreme than the landmark United States Supreme Court
decision which established speedy trial precedent the Wyoming Supreme
Court reached an opposite result. Whatever force was driving the Wyoming Supreme Court and whatever message it was trying to send was
done by compromising a long history of precedent, and the rights of
an innocent victim.
CHRISTOPHER J. WALSH

120. Since Harvey's case was a closer decision than that of Phillips, based on the
facts, the logical conclusion is that Phillips was also erroneously decided.
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